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Abstract
Classical corporation tax entails double taxation of corporate income. The
alternative practice to impute corporation tax to the domestic recipients of
dividends is shown, in the case of a company with international owners,
effectively to convert the imputation system back to a classical corporation
tax. It also requires complex rules for exempting flow-through dividends from
equalization tax to avoid the cumulation of corporation tax internationally. In
contrast, classical corporation tax maintains its simplicity and can be
designed so as to be neutral in respect of the financing and dividend
decisions of multinationals, by adopting double taxation of interest income.
Broad tax bases, flat-rate taxes on personal income from capital, and low
statutory tax rates are advocated as general policy
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Classical corporation tax regards corporations and their owners as separate tax entities and
therefore double-taxes their income, first the corporation and then the owners, on dividends
and realized capital gains. Such a tax system discriminates against the incorporation of
business ideas, restrains the supply of equity finance necessary for their economic utilisation,
reallocates resources from the corporate sector to the unincorporated one and thus causes an
efficiency loss to the whole economy (Harberger 1962). 
The need to eliminate these drawbacks led to tax reforms aimed at integrating the taxation of
corporations and their owners. Many EU countries adopted the approach to regard
corporation tax as a withholding tax of the owners’ final income tax. Therefore, it would be
credited on the distributed corporate profit against the owners’ income tax on dividends. This
system became known as the avoir fiscal in France and the imputation system in Britain, the
purpose of which is to ensure that dividend income is taxed once. Crediting the corporation
tax on the undistributed part of profits was not even considered because many European
countries do not tax long-term realized capital gains at all, or tax it at a lower legal rate than
dividends, with further benefit due to deferred realizations. Corporation tax on undistributed
profits was seen as an accrual based tax. Without it undistributed profits would escape
taxation altogether, which would be against the idea of a comprehensive income tax. 
Imputation credit is typically not extended to foreign shareholders nor is it granted on
dividends received from abroad, except on a reciprocal basis. Therefore the imputation
system does not eliminate the double taxation of foreign-source dividends or foreign-
destination dividends. On the contrary, foreign-source dividends distributed onward are
typically subject to an equalization tax in the home country of the dividend-distributing
company. The tax adjusts corporation taxes up to the imputation credit on dividends, if the
corporation tax falls short of it.
1 This means that foreign-source dividends are double-taxed
when leaving the country of the dividend-paying company, and the shareholders’ countries
of residence may levy their own dividend taxes.
                                                          
1 The operation of equalization tax differs in detail between national systems. An excellent reference is Harris
(1996).2
These features demonstrate that the imputation system is not a multinational-friendly
arrangement, and this is recognized in literature; see Boadway and Bruce (1992).
2 On the
practical side, Germany and Ireland decided to give up the imputation system altogether. The
UK and Norway have taken considerable steps away from it. This seems peculiar because
the imputation system was the favoured corporate tax system in the European tax
harmonization debate, and until the early 90’s the number of countries operating the
imputing system was increasing. Finland remains one of the countries that fully impute
corporation tax to tax-paying domestic recipients of dividends.
3
In the light of these developments it is useful to review some of the basic features of
corporation tax in an international setting. Below it is demonstrated more formally that:
(i)  corporation tax starts to cumulate if foreign-source dividends are tax exempt, but
onward-distributed dividends are subject to equalization tax, and more importantly
that
(ii)  given the mixture of foreign and domestic ownership, the imputation system
effectively converts back to a classical corporation tax with double taxation of
dividends when the imputation credit is not granted to foreign-destination dividends
of a multinational with foreign shareholders.
Therefore, some of the old properties of classical corporation tax are demonstrated: 
(iii)  a tax that does not allow for the deduction of interest expenses on debt, combined
with equal tax rates on interest, dividend and capital gains in the shareholders’
income taxation, is neutral with respect to financing and dividend decisions of the
firm (King 1974, 1977); hence the corporation tax base comprises of the return on
both equity and debt.
(iv)  in the case of multinationals corporation tax does not cumulate if the foreign
corporation tax is always either fully credited against the domestic tax in the country
                                                          
2 Alworth (1988, 37) quotes a Treasury Minister as saying “… the imputation system was invented by the
French to be beastly to the Americans” because it favours domestic ownership over foreign. In fact, Fuest and
Huber (2000) show that imputation credits are not optimal in an open economy from a welfare point of view.
3  The Finnish imputation system levies equalization tax if the imputation credit exceeds the corporation tax on
profits and the unutilized past tax surplus of the last ten years (previously paid taxes on undistributed profits).
There is  an exception to this rule. Equalization tax is not levied when tax-exempt remitted dividends from a
foreign subsidiary are paid to foreign shareholders (flow-through dividends). In this way the Finnish imputation
system attempts to eliminate the multiple taxation of cross-border dividend flows.3
receiving foreign-source income or is exempt from it, the two main ways of treating
foreign-source corporate income in the EU.
Property (iii) then simply extends double taxation to the whole income generated by the
corporation and adopts the flat-rate approach to the personal taxation of income from capital,
as currently in the Nordic countries. The design is then a double-tax version of the
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) -proposals, widely discussed in tax policy
literature over the past decade; see Cnossen (1996) and US Treasury (1992). It would also
offer a natural solution to the well-known difficulty of taxing foreign-source interest income
in the presence of interest deductibility and growing tax-exempt ownership (Bond 2000 and
Cnossen 1996).
The remainder proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the imputation system and develops
the key concepts for analysing the financial choices of a company that operates in its home
country only. Section 3 builds up assumptions and definitions regarding the international
taxation of income flows. Section 4 considers the case of a multinational and the tax
incentives for repatriating and distributing onward foreign-source income in the imputation
system. Section 5 demonstrates the advantage of the classical double-tax system over the
previous one. Section 6 concludes with a policy discussion. The appendix reviews the cost of
capital for internally financed domestic and foreign investments and how it does depend on
the personal tax rate of future dividends on such an equity.  This trapped equity approach is
the driving analytic force of the paper as a whole.
2. THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS
Following King (1974, 1977), the shareholders’ credit is defined in terms of the rate of
imputation u according to which the received dividend d is deemed already to have been
taxed in corporation tax. Therefore, the taxable gross dividend per euro of dividends
received is 1/(1-u) euros, which carries a credit of u/(1-u) of a euro. Both the dividend and
the credit are taxed at the personal income tax rate of  d τ . After the credit the investor’s
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An important element is the market valuation γ  of one euro of post-tax undistributed profit.
There are investors in the market who seek to benefit from the possibility of different tax
treatment of dividends and capital gains. In arbitrage equilibrium the market price γ  must be
such that investors are indifferent as between pocketing the post-tax dividends or selling
their shares. Then they realize a post-tax capital gain of  (1- g τ )γ  per euro of post-tax profit
of the corporation,  g τ  being the effective accrual-equivalent tax rate on undistributed profit
facing the investor. Hence, the no-arbitrage condition
(3)                (1- g τ )γ  = θ  
gives the market valuation coefficient of undistributed  profit
4
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In this section we assume the company to operate in its home country only (h-country). The
following additional concepts are needed to derive the total tax liability T of the corporation
and its financiers:
h y  =   real operating profit in the h-country, assumed also to be the taxable one
b = real interest expenses
β = a variable describing the degree of deductibility  of real interest expenses from the
corporate tax base, with β  =  0 when not at all deductible, and  β  = 1 when fully deductible; 
                                                          
4 This is the most direct way to derive the tax capitalization hypothesis which is the core of the trapped equity
argument, as developed by King (1977) and popularized by Auerbach (1983) and Sinn (1987) in particular.5
h τ   =  the rate of corporation tax in the h-country;  and
b τ  = the effective personal tax rate on real interest income.
The effective tax rates are typically different from the legal rates due to inflation, but the
problem is abstracted away in this paper. Now we obtain
(5) ( ) ( ) [ ]γ β τ τ β τ d b y b y b y T
h h h g h h − − − − + − =
( ) () u d u b
d b − − + + 1 / τ τ
where the first term is the corporation tax liability 
h T , the second is the shareholders’ capital
gains tax liability, the third is the interest income tax on debt, and the fourth the additional
personal dividend tax. In the second term the bracketed expression is the undistributed post-
corporation tax profit, which multiplied by γ  gives the true taxable capital gain. The
construction guarantees that the owners receive the same post-tax income whether post-
corporation tax profit is distributed or retained.
Consider the financial decisions of the company, adopting a purely static approach. The
question is how to allocate the real true post-tax income generated by the corporation among
real interest expenses on debt, dividends and retained profit that is capital gains to the
shareholders. The tax consequences of those decisions for both the corporation and investor
are partial derivatives of condition (5). Let us start from the trade-off between interest
expenses and retained profit. This is independent of the tax system,
 5 if the following holds: 
(6) b τ - 
h τβ   =  
g τ γ ) h 1 ( β τ −  
The lhs gives the combined net tax burden from allocating one euro of pre-tax profit to
interest payments: the investor’s tax on additional interest income minus the tax shield due
to their deductibility from the corporate tax base. This must be the same as the shareholder’s
                                                          
5 Formally conditions (6) and (7) respectively derive from  0 / = ∂ ∂ b T  and  0 / = ∂ ∂ d T .  The same
conditions follow from the necessary conditions of the underlying intertemporal problem.6
increased capital gains tax on the rhs, if the company decides not to increase its interest
payments, thus saving a net  ) h 1 ( β τ −  from one euro of interest expense.
6
Consider next the trade-off between allocating post-tax profit to dividends or retaining it for








That is, the investor’s additional tax burden must be the same, whether the corporation uses
one euro of post-tax profit on dividend distribution (lhs) or retains it in the corporation (rhs).
There is, of course, a third trade-off between debt and new share issues, which is given by
the left-hand sides of conditions (5) and (6). It is, however, redundant, for if (5) and (6) hold
simultaneously, the tax system does not distort the financing and dividend decisions of the
company.
It is immediately clear that the classical corporation tax (u = 0), without the deductibility of
debt interest β = 0, satisfies conditions (6)-(7) simultaneously 
(8a) γ τ τ
g b =
(8b) γ τ τ
g d =
if the following is true of all investors’ tax rates
(9)
g d b τ τ τ= = , 
whence γ =1 holds in the classical system.
7 The condition (9) is satisfied in principle in the 
                                                          
6 As a matter of fact, the interpretations of this and condition (7) are much more delicate as is evident in the
original reference (King 1974, 1977, ch, 4; see also Sinn 1987, ch. 4.2). The interpretations are, however, fully
sufficient for the clarity of the current policy problem.
7 Besides the uniformity of the flat-tax rates among investors, it should be emphasized that the taxation of true
economic income both at the corporation and investor levels is decisive for neutrality of financial policies.
Consideration of the investment incentives for different kinds of projects is beyond the scope of this paper, but
the appendix summarises the effect of the tax system on the minimum required rate of return on investment. 7
Nordic flat-rate system of taxing income from capital, only earned income being subject to
the progressive tax schedule. There conditions (8a-b) and (9) hold true except among tax-
free and tax-paying investor groups. The latter is double-taxed while the former is taxed
once. Hence, the only incentive is to channel savings and income from capital through tax-
free institutions. The classical corporation tax described is not neutral with respect to the
ownership of the corporations, though debt and dividend decisions are independent of the tax
system. 
Finally, to avoid the cumulation of domestic corporation tax, the natural solution is to
exempt all dividends and interest income received from other domestic corporations, or
otherwise corporation tax would have to be credited not only on received dividends, but also
on interest income, and the possible surplus credits be remitted.
The imputation system eliminates the double-taxation of dividends, but not that of
undistributed profits, which in some countries is not regarded as a problem due to the non-
existent or low effective capital gains tax rate. Yet Finland, for example, runs a capital gains
tax system where realized nominal capital gains are fully taxable
8 and unrealized gains are
subject to an annual wealth tax. Thus the approximate uniformity (9) of the tax rates is
reality. Hence it is obvious that the neutrality conditions (6)-(7) cannot hold under the
imputation system. To see this, substitute the value of γ in (4) into conditions (6) and (7), set
β = 1 because of the deductibility of interest expenses, use condition (9), and apply the full
imputation tax credit on dividends u  =  h τ  = 
d τ . Then the left-hand sides of conditions (6)-
(7) are zero, and the right-hand sides are equal to  g τ .  Such a system is neutral with respect
to the sources of outside finance, but discriminates against internal finance. Neutrality of
financial decisions would require the re-adoption of the old thinking, non-taxed long-term
capital gains, or crediting the corporation tax on the accumulated undistributed profits during
the ownership period as Norway does. In such a system a tax on capital gains realized before
the company earns any profit at all is a tax on pure rents.
                                                          
8 After a 10 year holding period 50 per cent of the total gross proceeds from the realized asset is taxable income
if that sum is less than if calculated on the basis of the original purchase price.8
3. THE INTERNATIONAL TAX FRAMEWORK
Define
f y  = true operating profit of a foreign subsidiary
hf b =  repatriated interest income from a foreign subsidiary
f b  =  real interest payments by a foreign subsidiary directly to investors.
Then the foreign corporation tax at the rate 
f τ is 
(10) [ ]     ) b b ( y         T
hf f f f f f + − =β τ  
where 
f β  denotes the deductible fraction of  real interest expenses. The parent company
may also repatriate dividends. The home country is assumed to credit the foreign corporation
tax on income from which repatriated dividends are derived, and any withholding taxes up to
the home country tax on the respective repatriated income. Therefore the total f- and h-
country taxes on the repatriated income of the parent company are:
(11)            hf b     ) w h ( , 0   max hf    wb    hf T  
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where w = the rate of the withholding tax in the f-country. Instead of crediting the
underlying foreign tax, the home country may exempt the foreign-source income from the h-
country tax, in which case the 0-arguments of the max-expressions are always true.
International investors are assumed to face the same tax rates on their interest, dividend and
capital gain income as h-country residents. Therefore their total personal tax liabilities on
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In (13) repatriated income does of course not affect the true operating profit 
f h y y y + =  or
total interest expenses 
f h b b b + = of the multinational, 
h T  denotes the h-country corporation
tax, and 
f d  = dividends paid out of repatriated income which are subject to equalization tax
() u u − 1 /  when distributed onward by the parent company. Therefore the equalization tax
reduces the undistributed post-tax profit in (13).
The total distribution is 
f h d d + , where 
h d  denotes dividends paid from income taxed at the
h-country rate of corporation tax. Thus, condition (1) must include not only the shareholders’















The total tax liability of the multinational and its investors on its debt and equity is made up
of the domestic corporation tax 
h T and conditions (10)-(14):
(15) d T g T b T hf T f T h T T + + + + + =
The tax consequences for incremental interest and dividend payments follow from condition
(15), analogously to conditions (6)-(7) from (5). Alworth (1988) and Keen (1991) study the
same issues, extending the intertemporal analysis of King (1974). The taxation of border-
crossing dividends is our main theme. Therefore, less attention is paid to the taxation of
interest income for which brief principles are given at the end of sections 5 and 6.10
4. DISTRIBUTIONS FROM REPATRIATED INCOME
The chain of dividend taxation is examined in two stages, repatriation and onward
distribution by the parent, assuming the imputation system to be in operation.  
Repatriation decision
Repatriation is examined in three different regimes. When the h-country credits foreign taxes
against and up to the domestic tax on foreign-source income, the parent is either in a state of
excess credits or deficit credits. The former (latter) occurs when the domestic tax liability on
foreign-source income is lower (higher) than creditable foreign corporation tax and
withholding tax. The third regime corresponds to the case where the h-country applies the
exemption method to the foreign-source income of the parent company.
If the dividend repatriation is
hf d , the additional net taxes of the multinational and its owners
are in the three regimes as follows:
(16a) w ) f 1 ( f   h    ); g 1 (   w hf d T/ τ τ τ γ τ− + < − = ∂ ∂  (excess  credits)
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(16c)                             ( );   - 1   w
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To interpret the net total tax effects in each regime, remember that one euro of post-
corporation tax profit is repatriated as dividend. Therefore in case (16a) the subsidiary pays
the withholding tax on it at rate w, which directly reduces the undistributed profit of the
multinational as a whole. Its market value is γw. Thus the owners save in their capital gains
tax liability, and (16a) gives the net tax effect of the two. 11
In (16b) the h-country recognizes that one euro of dividend results from 1/(1- f τ ) euros of
taxable income abroad, for which the parent pays domestic corporation tax at the rate  h τ ,
but receives the foreign tax credit of  f τ /(1- f τ ). Now the excess domestic corporation tax
over the foreign tax plays the same role as the withholding tax in (16a).  The only difference
concerns the distribution of tax revenues. In (16a) it is the source country of income and in
(16b) the h-country of the multinational that gains while in both cases the countries of
residence (r-countries) of the shareholders lose tax revenue. Condition (16c) speaks for itself.
Valuation of undistributed profit abroad
What is important in (16a-c) is that the coefficient γ now reflects the market value of post-
corporation tax profit retained abroad, which also depends on possible additional taxes in the
repatriation phase. Let this be represented by 
f γ . Its  value derives from an analogous
arbitrage condition to (3) as follows:
 (17) ( )
hf f g θ γ τ 1 = −
where 
hf θ  denotes the post-tax dividend accruing to the shareholders of the parent from one
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The first term in the curly braces is the dividend of one euro, the second the possible excess
domestic corporation tax on it, and the third the withholding tax on it. The expression itself
in the curly braces is the declared dividend of the parent resulting from the repatriation. The
final multiplier term on the rhs defines the dividend after the owners’ dividend tax. At the
moment the imputation credit is assumed to be extended to all shareholders, also by those
whose r-country differs from that of the multinational. This is equivalent to the assumption
that the r-countries apply the credit method to the foreign-source dividends of all investors,12
crediting both the withholding tax and the underlying corporation tax. Tax revenues,
however, are allocated differently.
The value of 
f γ  now follows from conditions (17) and (18) in the regime of (16a), when the





































follows. In the third regime of (16c), the h-country applies the exemption method, and
dividends from the subsidiary, when distributed further to shareholders, are subject to
equalization tax
9 determined on the basis of the dividend distribution  f d . Therefore
conditions (17)-(18) now give
(19c) () ()
() () u 1 τ 1







Keen (1991) does not explicitly derive market valuation coefficients in different tax regimes.
In our case they enhance the comprehension and transparency of analysis.
Total additional tax of onward distributed repatriated dividend 
The total additional tax due to the repatriation and onward distribution by the parent is thus
the sum of the effect in (16a-b) and the marginal dividend tax in condition (1), with the
                                                          
9 For presentational purposes the equalization tax is modelled only in the combination of the exemption
method. In fact, the tax is also relevant in the case of excess credits (16a).13
respective 
f γ  in (19a-c). In the case of exemption (16c), the onward distribution decision
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f γ from (19c)
It can be seen from (20a-c) that, in comparison to a solely domestic company, the neutrality
of the dividend decision with the full imputation credit u  = 
h τ  = 
d τ and with a zero capital
gains tax rate requires the additional taxes both in the repatriation phase (the withholding tax
or the excess of the domestic corporation tax rate over the foreign one) and the equalization
tax to be zero. Were the dividend and debt financing decisions both simultaneously to be
independent of the tax system, the foreign corporation tax rate at which interest expenses are
deductible would have to equal both the domestic corporation tax rate and the personal tax
rate on interest by an analogous condition to (6) and (9).
10 The cost of capital would then be
the same for each source of finance and the same both in the f- and the h-countries; see
appendix. These neutrality results are in conformity with Keen (1991) and Boadway and
Bruce (1992) subject to the inclusion of equalization tax here.
Treatment of foreign shareholders
Introduce next the crucial property that the imputation credit is not extended to the foreign
shareholders of the parent.
11 Assume that their ownership share is η and that they pay tax in
the countries of residence on dividends at the same rate 
d τ as the h-country investors.  Hence
                                                          
10 Under these circumstances interest payments from the subsidiary directly to investors or through the parent
company face the same effective tax burden as that on dividend flows.14
the proportion 1-η of the shareholders receive the full
12 imputation credit u =  h τ  = 
d τ when



























f h d d d + = . This affects expression (18), the post-tax dividend 
hf θ , in which the tax
rate 
d T is determined from (21) by setting  1 =
f d . 
The nature of arbitrage changes, too. There are now two kinds of arbitrators, both the foreign
and domestic, arbitrating between post-tax dividends and capital gains. In addition, there is a
group of arbitrators, daytraders, consisting of large financial institutions and small investors,
who arbitrate away any share price differences between the above two groups. Therefore in
equilibrium
13 they face the same share price both on cum-dividend and ex-dividend days.
The post-tax capital gain must then be a weighted average of the post-tax dividends of the
two groups analogously to condition (17). 
From it the market valuation coefficient of undistributed foreign profits is derived in the
three regimes as follows:































                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 Nor can mutual funds and non-taxable domestic shareholders such as pension insurance companies and
trusts, foundations, unions, and associations serving a public purpose claim the tax credit back in the Finnish
system.
12  The modeling of a partial imputation credit would only lead to clumsier expressions, without changing our
conclusions in substance.
13 In practice there are trading costs, and the profitability of stripping dividends around ex-dividend days
depends additionally on the dividend yields and tick rules, as analysed in detail by Sorjonen (2000). The factors
cause an arbitrage band around each group’s tax-determined reservation price. The arbitrage bands may




















It is immediately clear in case (22a) that the valuation parameter of internal equity is the
same as under the classical system when u=0 holds in (19a). The only difference is that the
dividend tax rate is weighted by the share of foreign shareholders η d τ . The same is of
course true in case  (22b) and (22c), exemption plus the equalization tax. The total tax effect
of repatriation and onward distribution is then as follows:
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from which the obvious case of deficit credits is omitted and where γ  is the respective 
η f γ
from (22a,c). When the h-country of the parent fully imputes the corporation tax to its
resident shareholders u = 
h τ  = 
d τ , the first terms in (23a-c) are zeros.  The combined effect
of the remaining three terms should then be zero for the tax neutrality of repatriation and
onward distribution. This justifies a positive capital gains tax rate, which would be 
d g ητ τ =
in the case of no withholding tax w = 0. However, the distortion in favour of debt finance
remains because of interest deductibility. 
The case of exemption (22c) differs from the case of excess credits (22a) only by having a
lower market valuation of foreign internal equity due to the cumulative effect of
equalization tax. This explains why in Finland politicians have granted a concession from
equalization tax for onward-distributed dividends paid abroad. The exemption of foreign-
source dividends in the r-country of the multinational is not consistent with the imputation
system and equalization tax. 16
Hence in the case of not extending imputation credits to foreign shareholders the imputation
system effectively converts to a classical corporation tax with double-taxed equity but once-
taxed debt irrespective of whether the home country of the parent company runs a system of
foreign corporation tax credit or exempts foreign-source dividends. Thus the multinational
ownership structure of a multinational together with an imputation system in its home
country potentially distorts its financial structure. Contrasting these results to those of the
previous subsection, brings forth the necessity of extending imputation credits to foreign
shareholders to achieve financial neutrality in the imputation system.
5. GLOBAL CLASSICAL CORPORATION TAX  
The natural question then arises that if the behavioural incentives of classical corporation tax
are an unavoidable property of the practical imputation systems in an international
perspective, why not adopt it directly without the current administrative complexities. And
why not adopt it without the deductibility of debt interest expenses globally.
In such a case there is no economic justification for collecting withholding tax. So let us
assume w = 0 as well as uniformity (9) of flat-tax rates on all kinds of income from capital,
whence γ = 1 holds under classical corporation tax, u = 0. Then the total tax effect from
repatriation and onward distribution is zero in cases of excess credits (20a) and exemption
(20c). What is paid in dividend tax due to those decisions is saved in capital gains tax. The
repatriation and onward distribution of dividends is independent of the tax system. Equity
income is double-taxed, first in the r-countries of the subsidiary and parent on their domestic
income, thereafter in the r-countries of the investors at the tax rates  . g d τ τ=
The r-countries of the investors collect revenue from dividend tax, capital gains tax and
interest income tax. The r-countries of the corporations collect corporation tax revenue at
their respective rates. Under these conditions the deficit credits case (20b) is only slightly
different, because the h-country corporate tax rate exceeds the foreign one and therefore
collects some corporation tax revenue with respective incentives to delay repatriation. To see
the significance of this regime for the overall neutrality requirement for financial policies,
consider now the decision to repatriate interest income, but continuing to assume classical17
corporation tax, without the deductibility of interest expenses β=0, and with the uniformity
condition (9) of flat-tax rates irrespective of the investors’ r-countries.
Interest payments directly to investors
Consider a multinational, the foreign subsidiary of which pays interest expenses directly to
its international investors. Assume for the moment the existence of a foreign withholding tax
w. Analogously to (6), the total tax consequence of paying interest expenses is zero when the
following holds:
(24a) b        w   ); f f 1 ( g        f f w τ β τ γ τ β τ≥ − = −  (excess  credits)
(24b)  w b      ); f f 1 ( g        f f b > − = −τ β τ γ τ β τ τ  (deficit  credits)
where γ is given by conditions (19) and depends on the withholding tax rate. But, without
interest deductibility β = 0, there is no economic justification for the withholding tax any
more. Hence, set w = 0 and eliminate condition (24a). The valuation factor of internal equity
γ = 1 now holds with uniform personal tax rates (9). Tax neutrality would then prevail as
between decisions to increase and decrease interest payments along with their non-
deductibility . 0
h f = =β β
14
Repatriation of interest
With non-deductibility of interest expenses the only consistent way is to exempt them in the
taxation of the parent company. In the end it will be double-taxed when distributed onward,
at the rate  b τ  when paid to those investing in the debt of the parent, or at the equal dividend
tax (9) if in the form of dividends. Withholding tax and crediting of it are consistent only
with interest deductibility.
                                                          
14 On the other hand, the reporting of foreign-source interest income is regarded as a problem. Were there a
withholding tax 
b τ w =  in combination with non-deductibility, no control or obligation to report them under
exemption would be required. Nor would investors’ r-countries collect any tax revenue.18
6. CONCLUSION
Both the imputation system, which credits corporation tax on dividends to shareholders, and
classical corporation tax, which double-taxes dividends, are examined as tax systems of a
multinational, the ownership of which is internationally dispersed. Most international tax
literature deals with the tax incentives of repatriation within a multinational under different
ways of treating repatriated income in the taxation of the parent company. The analysis here
is extended to take the tax incentives of onward distribution into account, i.e. via the
capitalization of equalization tax and foreign shareholders’ potential imputation credit in the
market value of undistributed profits of foreign subsidiaries.
The major finding
15 is that, when the restriction of the imputation system in not extending
the imputation credit to dividends paid abroad is taken into account, the imputation system
effectively converts back to a classical system with double-taxation of equity income,
favouring debt finance, the system it was supposed to replace. This property occurs
irrespective of whether the exemption method or the foreign tax credit is applied to the
taxation of repatriated income. As there are administrative complexities in running the
imputation system so as to avoid the cumulation of corporation tax internationally, the paper
addresses to the benefits of classical corporation tax as a global system.
The particular design advocated here is to extend double-taxation to the entire income of a
corporation. Classical corporation tax, without the deductibility of interest expenses, but
combined in personal taxation with uniformity of flat-tax rates among all categories of
income from capital, is demonstrated to produce
(i)  neutrality with respect to the sources of finance, if the rates of corporation tax and the
personal flat-tax rates of income from capital tend to converge to the same level in
each country because of  tax competition and global harmonization efforts; the return
                                                          
15 In the appendix the Hartman-Sinn result, in which the potential “dividend tax” of the repatriation phase does
not affect the incentive to expand or contract a capital stock abroad, is extended so that neither does dividend
tax on repatriation or onward distribution, including equalization tax and foreign shareholders’ potential
imputation credits, affect the cost of capital of a foreign investment financed from profit retention. Instead,
repatriation and onward-distribution dividend taxes are shown to affect the average tax rate of undistributed
profits of foreign subsidiaries via   capitalizing into the market value, the precise reason why they do not affect
the cost of capital. 19
on outside equity, internal equity and debt would be double-taxed, first at the
corporate level, thereafter at the investor level
(ii)  fair division of tax revenues among the resident countries of corporations and
investors
(iii)  administrative simplicity; income from other corporations would be non-taxable to
the receiving corporation; there is no justification for withholding tax on repatriated
income when the payer is another corporation
(iv)  apprehension and clarity
The kind of system outlined above is not free from the general handicaps of comprehensive
income tax due to its obstinacy in taxing income from capital on an accrual basis, which
distorts intertemporal saving and investment decisions, and its quality of not treating all
categories of ownership equally. That is why savings tend to be channelled through the non-
taxed sector, distorting the ownership structure of the corporate sector. International tax
competition towards lower legal tax rates and tax harmonization efforts aimed at broader tax
bases would reduce these distortions.
The blueprint for international tax co-ordination would entail adopting
(i)  true economic income as the basis of  both corporation and personal income tax
(ii)  a dual approach in the latter, where all categories of income from capital would be
taxed at the same flat rate and separately from earned income, which is taxed at
progressive rates
16
(iii)  classical corporation tax without deductibility of interest on debt as a global system
(iv)  the exemption method in the taxation of all corporate-source income, foreign or
domestic
and elimination of
(v)  annual wealth taxes
(vi)  imputation credits, equalization taxes and other restrictions on flow-through
dividends and realized capital gains, within the corporate sector.
                                                          
16  The splitting of income of non-listed companies into capital income and earned income is regarded as
necessary in those countries where marginal tax rates on earned income exceed the double-tax rate on income
from capital, as in Nordic countries.20
The line between debt and equity is thin. Non-voting preferred stock and long-term
subordinated bonds, both convertible to common stock, are economically very close
instruments except for their tax treatment. Classical corporation tax without interest
deductibility would make such distinctions irrelevant. No thin capitalization rules in the
countries hosting subsidiaries of multinationals would be needed. The lifting of interest
deductibility would of course cause problems of transition,
17 but it would solve the problem
of interest income taxation, mentioned at the outset, taxing it effectively at source, as
envisaged by Cnossen (1996).
Finally, there is the question of tax havens. They mostly cannot invest productively in their
own jurisdictions the funds they receive, but elsewhere. Investment income from funds, the
marketing of which is registered in the investor’s country of residence, would be taxed in the
same way as income from domestic funds, with all deals reported to the tax authorities.
Investment income from tax havens paid directly to investors would thus face at least the
same effective tax burden as that enjoyed by non-taxed institutions from their domestic and
foreign investments. Thus tax havens may be seen as vehicles of tax competition and as
enhancing economic efficiency.
 
                                                          
17 An obvious rule would be eliminating it on all new borrowing, continuing to levy withholding tax on long-
term bonds issued before the regime shift and phasing out it on old bank borrowing within the customary roll-
over period of such loans. 21
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APPENDIX:  INVESTMENT DECISION AND “TRAPPED EQUITY”
In the main text the emphasis is on the tax neutrality of the financing decisions of a
multinational. Satisfaction of this does not guarantee intertemporal neutrality, which
comprehensive income taxation (CIT) deliberately breaks, because it taxes the return on
saving. In CIT, neutrality in respect of financing decisions means uniform taxation of all
modes of saving for all savers. The investment decision is summarised briefly here, and
extended to the different regimes of international taxation. Because the cost of capital is
most controversial in the case of internal finance, it is almost the sole focus. Nor are tax
depreciation allowances and similar investment incentives taken into account.
Define
MRR
h  = the marginal pre-tax real rate of return on investment after true economic
depreciation
           r  =  the pre-tax real rate of interest on the alternative financial investment
When the company refrains from a dividend distribution of one euro and instead invests it,
the shareholder’s wealth increases by γ  euros. The investment yields a post-tax dividend
stream to the shareholder equal to  ) 1 ( h τ θ− MRR
h  in every future period, assuming the true
depreciation to be continuously reinvested, which maintains the income generating power of
the asset intact. The company invests up to the point at which the real rate of return on
investment equals to the post-tax return on the shareholder’s alternative financial asset: 
(A 1)       )r τ (1
γ




where  θ  is from (2) and γ  from (4). These give  ) 1 /( g τ θ γ− = , which implies that θ
appears both in the numerator and denominator of  (A1). The pre-tax cost of capital on
investment financed from a marginal euro of post-tax profit retained is thus
(A 2)      









The striking feature of this is that dividend distributions on equity accumulated from
undistributed post-tax profits no longer face the personal dividend tax  d τ , because the
dividend tax is already deducted from the share price γ  at the instant of profit retention. It
follows that the tax rate of a marginal investment
(A 3)       ) τ (1 τ τ
MRR





does not depend on the dividend tax rate  d τ  when the source of finance is profit. This
phenomenon, the capitalization of the dividend tax in the share price, is the “trapped equity”
-argument. Dividend tax is paid in any case, whether one euro of post-tax profit is distributed24
or retained, because dividends are the only way to channel the return on investment to
shareholders.  The marginal tax rate of investment (A 3), however, is made up of both the tax
wedge of the investing company  h τ  and that of  supplying finance    ) 1 ( h g τ τ− .
Because the dividend tax  d τ  is deducted in the market price of undistributed profit, it affects
the average tax rate. When each euro of the true pre-corporation tax profit retained is taxed
and when shareholders’ accrual-equivalent capital gains tax is paid on the market value of
the remaining post-tax profit, the average tax rate of the undistributed part of profit
18 is
(A 4)       )γ τ (1 τ τ ATR
h g h − + = ,
which clearly depends on  d τ  γ  from (4). If γ  is less than one, as is often assumed to be
case due to the fact that the effective  g τ tends to be less than  d τ  in most tax systems, the
average tax rate (A 4) is lower than the marginal one (A 3). If  1 = γ  holds as with uniform
flat-tax rates (9), tax rates (A3) and (A4) are equal. If the corporation tax system is the
classical one without interest deductibility but with uniform tax rates (9), the tax rates (A3-4)
are also naturally equal to those on the debt-financed part of the company  ) h 1 ( b h τ τ τ− +
and on the part of the company financed from outside equity  ) h 1 ( d h τ τ τ− + . If the
company earns economic profit over its real cost of finance, i.e. it adds value, the average tax
rate of the whole company is defined by (A4), when the tax rates satisfy condition (9).
The essentials of the “trapped equity” -argument do not change when the company is a
multinational. It still follows from condition (A1) that the net dividend 
hf θ  in (18) pocketed
from the repatriated dividend is cancelled out by the numerator 
f γ  (conditions 19a-c).
19
Dividend taxes, whether in the repatriation or onward distribution phase, are unavoidable.
The only difference from the expression (A2) is that the foreign corporation tax rate
f τ of the
investing subsidiary enters the cost of capital 
f MRR instead of the h-country rate. Also, in
cases where the h-country applies the imputation system, but does not extend it to the
dividends received from and distributed abroad, the cost of capital remains unaffected. But,
in both cases the relevant 
f γ has an effect on the average tax rate (A4), increasing it when
fη γ  in (22a-c) holds true. 
Hence the cost of capital of a foreign subsidiary and the international allocation of capital
depends on the dividend tax system if the subsidiary is marginally financed with newly
raised outside equity, as analysed by Keen (1991).
                                                          
18 Formally (A4) is derived by setting d=b=0 in (5) and dividing the resulting total tax liability by pre-tax
income of the corporation. The ATR is hence comparable to an effective average income tax rate.
19  This is known as the Hartman-Sinn result, the relevant references being Sinn (1984) and Hartman (1985).
Keen (1991) discusses it, including its break-down when profitability of the parent company and its foreign
subsidiary are interdependent.